Shrinking Secular Spaces: Assessing Radicalization in Post-Awami League Bangladesh
Shrinking Secular Spaces: Assessing Radicalization in Post-Awami League Bangladesh
19 June 2026
Introduction: Power Vacuums and Ideological Realignments
The dissolution of the fifteen-year Awami League administration on August 5, 2024, precipitated a seismic shift in Bangladesh’s political landscape. While the student-led uprising originated as a push for social justice and employment quota reform, it rapidly devolved into widespread civil unrest. The resulting security vacuum provided a permissive environment for radical and hardline religious factions to reassert influence within the nation’s premier academic institutions (New Indian Express, 2024). This report analyzes the resurgence of previously proscribed organizations, the weaponization of blasphemy allegations to stifle dissent, and the transformation of Dhaka University into a primary battleground for ideological dominance (RSIS, 2025).
The Resurgence of Proscribed Organizations
Groups that were either banned or forced underground during the previous decade have resurfaced with unprecedented speed. Most notable among these are ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir’ and elements affiliated with ‘Ansar al-Islam’ (RSIS, 2025).
Public Presence at Dhaka University: Following the government’s collapse, ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir’ began conducting open marches and distributing leaflets advocating for the establishment of a Caliphate. Previously forced to operate in the shadows, these members now openly propagate their agenda at key campus landmarks (Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh, 2026).
Targeted Recruitment: Researchers note that these groups are specifically targeting high-performing students through sophisticated digital radicalization and campus networking, effectively filling the void left by the dismantling of traditional political structures (Shah et al., 2025).
The Weaponization of Mob Violence and Blasphemy
A disturbing trend has emerged wherein accusations of religious defamation are weaponized to justify physical violence. This mechanism of control has silenced secular discourse and cultivated a pervasive atmosphere of fear (SSPCOnline, 2025).
Ideological Purging: In numerous instances, groups of students—often galvanized by extremist rhetoric—have targeted peers accused of “un-Islamic” behavior. This culture of intimidation has extended to faculty members, many of whom have been harassed or coerced into resignation by hardline factions. Human rights observers suggest these actions reflect a broader effort to impose a singular religious identity on historically pluralistic campuses (European Union Agency for Asylum, 2025).
Systematic Insecurity Among Minority Students
Students from Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian communities are navigating a period of acute vulnerability. Since August 2024, there has been a documented increase in targeted harassment, often conflating the religious identity of minority students with the previous political regime (Christian Solidarity International, 2025).
Cultural Erosion: Academic spaces that once hosted diverse cultural festivals are increasingly seeing these events branded as incompatible with “national values.” At Dhaka University, traditional inclusive celebrations have been curtailed, replaced by a rigid environment where religious identity dictates one’s safety and social standing (Gov.uk, 2025).
The New Equation of Campus Politics
With the disappearance of the Chhatra League, the student wing of the former Awami League—the ‘Bangladesh Islami Chhatra Shibir’ has adopted a highly strategic posture.
Strategic Positioning: Shibir has successfully reframed its narrative from a marginalized entity to a disciplined alternative for students disillusioned by previous political excesses. By providing social services and maintaining a structured presence, they have gained significant leverage over university administrations and student policy (Bashar, 2025).
The Shrinking Secular Corridor: Dhaka University, the historical cradle of Bangladeshi secularism and democratic movements, is witnessing the erosion of its intellectual diversity. Any discourse perceived as deviating from hardline interpretations is frequently labeled anti-religious, leading to the cancellation of seminars and the censorship of student publications (RSIS, 2026).
The September 18 University Lynchings: A Turning Point
On September 18, 2024, two separate incidents of mob lynching occurred at the country’s two most prestigious universities, signaling a profound breakdown in the rule of law on campus (Mizan & Rubel, 2024).
The Tofazzal Hossain Case (Dhaka University): Tofazzal Hossain, a mentally unstable man, was detained by students at Fazlul Huq Muslim Hall on suspicion of mobile theft. In a harrowing display of “vigilante justice,” he was subjected to a hours-long beating. Reports indicate students provided him a meal during the ordeal before resuming the assault until he succumbed to his injuries (Mizan & Rubel, 2024).
The Shamim Ahmed Case (Jahangirnagar University): On the same day, Shamim Ahmed, a former leader of the Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL), was beaten to death by a student mob. He was targeted for his alleged role in suppressing protesters during the July uprising (Hossain, 2024). These twin murders underscored how students—who spearheaded the democratic revolution—became perpetrators of the very extrajudicial violence they once condemned.
The Public Re-emergence of Hizb ut-Tahrir
Since August 5, the banned extremist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) has transitioned from clandestine operations to overt public mobilization.
The Baitul Mukarram March for Khilafat: On March 7, 2025, HT organized a large-scale rally at the south gate of the Baitul Mukarram National Mosque. Despite police blockades and the arrest of 36 members, the group successfully gathered hundreds to chant for the establishment of a Caliphate (Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh, 2026).
Campus Recruitment: Investigative reports from early 2025 indicate that HT has been actively distributing leaflets and holding “study circles” at Dhaka University and North South University, exploiting the absence of traditional student politics to recruit from the intellectual elite (Shah et al., 2025).
Targeting of Faculty and Secular Intellectuals
The post-August period witnessed a wave of forced resignations of university officials, often driven by religious or political vendettas.
The Nadira Yasmin Case (May 2025): Professor Nadira Yasmin was forced to transfer to other colleges under intense pressure from groups such as ‘Hefazat-e-Islam’. These groups labeled her work as a women’s rights activist “ti-Islamic,” highlighting the new capacity of religious pressure groups to dictate academic staffing (USCIRF, 2025).
Administrative Purges: Across 19 cities, at least 1,500 cultural symbols, murals, and memorials—including those honoring secular feminist icons like Begum Rokeya—were vandalized between August 5 and August 7 (TandfOnline, 2025). This ‘cultural cleansing’ was often led by mobs intent on erasing secular narratives from public and academic spheres.
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Violence Against Religious Minorities on University Campuses
While many post-August attacks were politically motivated, the religious identity of minority students frequently rendered them vulnerable to “retributory justice.”
Chittagong Campus Unrest: Following the government’s collapse, the Chittagong Hill Tracts and regional university campuses experienced a surge in communal friction. Mobs utilized digital misinformation—referred to as the “Mob-Viral-Justice Loop”—to incite violence against minority students, frequently targeting them under the pretext of their alleged status as “agents” of the former regime (Mustak Ahmed, 2025).
Statistical Breakdown: According to the Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council, there were 2,184 documented incidents of violence against minorities between August 4 and December 31, 2024. Although the government characterized most of these events as purely political, 20 were officially classified as communal (Gov.uk, 2025).
Institutional Failure and the Lack of State Oversight
The proliferation of extremism is largely attributable to the absence of effective state oversight during the transition. While the interim government prioritized broad administrative reforms, the subtle ideological transformation of campuses remained largely unaddressed. The perceived inaction of law enforcement has further emboldened radical groups to operate with a sense of impunity (Bashar, 2025).
The Weaponization of Religious Sentiment Against Faculty
A defining feature of the post-revolutionary period has been the use of religious grievances to purge university administrations.
The Case of Professor Abdul Bashir (Dhaka University): On August 19, 2024, Professor Abdul Bashir, the Dean of the Faculty of Arts at Dhaka University, was forced to resign following intense student pressure. The primary grievance cited by the mob was that he had allegedly “obstructed” a Quran recitation program on campus during the previous month of Ramadan (Times Now, 2024). Following his resignation, a viral video showed students forcing him to listen to a ‘Surah’ recitation in his office as a form of symbolic humiliation.
Mass Resignations of Vice-Chancellors: Within weeks of the government’s collapse, at least 13 Vice-Chancellors from major public universities—including Dhaka University, Jahangirnagar University, and Rajshahi University—were forced to step down (Banglanews24, 2024). While many cited “personal reasons,” observers noted a consistent pattern of ‘mob-led accountability’ where any academic perceived as having secular or pro-Awami League leanings was targeted for removal (Dhaka Tribune, 2024).
Radical Symbols and the “Moral Policing” of Students
The vacuum left by the collapse of the central government allowed hardline factions to impose a new “moral code” on campus life.
Dress Code Harassment at Dhaka University: In March 2025, a male individual was apprehended by locals at Dhaka University for sexually harassing a female student over her “improper” dress. In a significant display of extremist power, a radical mob laid siege to the police station where the man was held. They eventually secured his release, live-streaming the event as they draped him in garlands and hailed him as a “warrior of faith” (Atlantic Council, 2025).
The Resurgence of the Jihadi Flag: Since August 2024, investigative reports and social media documentation have shown a marked increase in the display of extremist symbols. Black “Rayat” flags and insignia associated with Al-Qaeda and ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir’ have been seen at student rallies, often replacing the national flag or secular student banners (RSIS, 2025).
The Systematic Destruction of Secular Cultural Symbols
The transition period facilitated an organized effort to erase the secular and pluralistic identity of university spaces.
Vandalism: Between August 5 and August 7, 2024, over 1,494 monuments, sculptures, and murals were vandalized across Bangladesh (Wikipedia, 2026). On campuses, this led to the destruction of memorials to the Independence War and statues of cultural icons.
Cancellation of Cultural Events: In November 2024, the annual festival commemorating the Baul mystic Lalon Fakir in Narayanganj was cancelled due to violent intimidation by Hefazat-e-Islam members, who argued that music is “prohibited in Islam” (Wikipedia, 2026). This precedent quickly spread to university campuses, where traditional Bengali cultural programs (such as ‘Basanta Utsav) have faced similar threats.
The “Mob-Viral-Justice” Loop and Marginalized Groups
A new phenomenon has emerged wherein digital rumors precipitate immediate physical violence.
Ahmadiyya and Sufi Targets: Beyond attacks on Hindu minorities, Muslim minority groups have also faced significant persecution. At least 40 Sufi shrines and several Ahmadiyya mosques were razed by mobs between August 2024 and mid-2025 (Atlantic Council, 2025). In university towns, students belonging to these sects reported being “outed” on social media and subsequently harassed or expelled from dormitories by hardline groups.
The “Inqilab Moncho” and the Radicalization of Public Spaces
The emergence of the Inqilab Moncho (Revolutionary Platform) in late 2024 represents a significant shift from student activism to religious populism.
The Assassination of Osman Hadi: The death of Osman Hadi, a prominent spokesperson for the ‘Inqilab Moncho’, served as a catalyst for widespread extremist violence. Following his shooting—allegedly by remnants of the former ruling party—mobs conducted coordinated arson attacks on the offices of ‘Prothom Alo’ and ‘The Daily Star’, the country’s leading secular newspapers. These media outlets were labeled “agents of foreign influence and ‘enemies of Islam’ (Wikipedia, 2025).
Targeting Cultural Institutions: During the December 2025 riots, cultural bastions such as *Chhayanaut* and ‘Bangladesh Udichi Shilpigoshthi’ – symbols of Bengali secular identity – were vandalized. Extremist leaders publicly demanded the permanent closure of these institutions, arguing they promote “un-Islamic” values (Guardian, 2025).
High-Tech Extremism: The Algorithmic Radicalization Loop
A critical factor in the rapid flourishing of campus extremism is the ‘Mob-Viral-Justice’ loop, where digital disinformation translates into immediate physical violence.
AI-Generated Incitement: Throughout 2025, there was a surge in AI-generated “martyrdom” videos and manipulated audio clips showing university students allegedly insulting religious texts. One notable incident in Sylhet involved a viral video that was later proven to be a deepfake; however, before it could be debunked, a mob had already razed the student’s family home (Preprints.org, 2025).
The “Rayat” Flag Trend: On campuses like Rajshahi University (RU) and Chittagong University (CU), the black flag often associated with global jihadist movements became a frequent sight during Friday processions. These displays were frequently accompanied by the “Takbir” slogan, effectively replacing secular nationalist symbols (RSIS, 2025).
The “Silent Purge” of Secular Academics
The period between August 2024 and mid-2025 saw the systematic dismantling of the secular academic hierarchy through “forced resignations.”
Case Study: Rajshahi University (RU): Following the Vice-Chancellor’s resignation, a “Moral Supervisory Committee” composed of radicalized students began auditing faculty lectures. Professors who taught evolutionary biology or secular philosophy were frequently interrupted and forced to issue public apologies for “harming religious sentiments” (SSPC, 2025).
The Judicial Vacuum: The release of over 2,200 prisoners, including at least 70 high-profile militants, during the chaotic August transition significantly weakened the state’s counter-terrorism apparatus. Many of these individuals have since been documented leading “study circles” near major university campuses (RSIS, 2025).
Communal Violence and the Displacement of Identity
The vulnerability of minority students peaked during the Durga Puja celebrations of October 2024 and 2025.
Documented Desecration: According to the UN Human Rights Office (OHCHR), between August 2024 and February 2025, there were over 1,769 documented incidents targeting religious minorities, including the destruction of 25 religious idols during a single festival cycle in October 2024 (OHCHR, 2026).
Exhumation and Desecration: In a chilling incident in September 2025, extremists in Jamalpur exhumed the body of a local cleric, Nurul Haque Molla, claiming his teachings were heterodox. Such incidents signal that even the deceased are not safe from the reach of fanaticism (OHCHR, 2026).
Conclusion
The expansion of extremism within Bangladeshi universities since August 5, 2024, represents a critical challenge to the country’s democratic future. Without a concerted effort to restore security and safeguard freedom of thought, these institutions risk evolving into centers of radicalization. While public perception has often attributed these incidents to government-backed terrorism, the survival of Bangladesh’s intellectual heritage depends on the state’s ability to reclaim these spaces from extremist influence and ensure the safety of all students, regardless of their creed or conviction.
References
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